The Myth of the Rational Insurgent

Lambert Strether over at Naked Capitalism reposted a presentation I delivered at Stanford last August, called “Confronting the Myth of the Rational Insurgent.” You can access his post and my presentation here.

A debate is unfolding in the comments section of the post. I address many of the questions raised here in a paper I am writing for the ISA Annual Meetings in San Diego in April. Most of the critiques the NC readers are raising about the data, however, are addressed and dealt with in my book with Maria Stephan. For anyone interested, the data and appendix used for the book are available at my research page.

As Maria and I emphasize, our book is not meant to be the last word. Instead, we hope it will catalyze new and improved research on the topic of civil resistance–a field I’ve been encouraging security studies scholars to take seriously. One of the ways I’ve been hoping to attract greater attention to the topic of civil resistance has been to develop this “myths” talk, which I have tested out on a few different audiences. It’s supposed to be provocative, and it generally has elicited fairly strong reactions. The response over at NC is no exception.

My hope is not to provoke discussion for its own sake. Instead, my goals are twofold: 1) to encourage more systematic empirical research on the topic; and 2) to persuade people, on the basis of existing empirical research, that nonviolent resistance can often be a viable alternative for challenging entrenched power.

Denial: Not Just a River in Egypt

Last week I wrote a post on the Monkey Cage arguing that Syria now qualifies as a civil war, by standard scholarly definitions. Jeremy Pressman wrote a smart response that asks why anyone would deny that a country was experiencing a civil war. After all, what are the risks? A declaration of a civil war does not carry with it any real international obligations, like a declaration of a genocide does. Pressman makes the point that the reluctance to call Syria a civil war can be attributed to U.S. interests or norms. He writes:

one possibility is that the Obama administration prefers a narrative of democratic protest against a brutal regime. A civil war, which means both pro- and anti-regime violence, muddies that narrative.

He goes on to suggest that

admitting a full-fledged civil war is underway muddies the narrative that the US is going to help and protect the non-violent movement against the brutal and violent regime. Members of Congress and the US public would probably be less likely to support increasing intervention if they realize a civil war is underway.

Pressman concludes with this observation:

Could Obama officials be worried that calling Syria a civil war might negatively affect the calculations of groups inside Syria such as Druze, Christians, members of the business community etc?

I think Pressman is onto something. Calling the Syrian conflict a “civil war” would likely cause officials in the US and abroad to consider more serious policy options than the current label of “unrest” which dominates media coverage of the conflict. I have a couple additional thoughts:

1). Concerns about legitimizing Assad’s propaganda. Because most of the violence is by the regime against unarmed protestors, it still looks like a classic case of one-sided violence. International observers may resist calling the conflict a “civil war” in order to maintain the sense that the Syrian population is being wrongfully victimized, and that the regime is the sole perpetrator. In Assad’s most recent televised address, he claims that the country is being held hostage by armed Islamists and terrorists. Most observers deny such claims, as well as the regime’s claim that “terrorists” have killed 2,000 soldiers and regime functionaries. Of course, it is highly likely that the regime has exaggerated its losses, and Assad is clearly misrepresenting the opposition and its demands. But it is equally clear that in recent months, regime loyalists have become casualties of violent attacks from the opposition side. The international community may be slow to call the Syrian conflict a civil war for fear that Assad might feel even more emboldened about the fight.

2). Ambiguities about the organizational capacity of the Free Syrian Army vs. local militias. For some people, a necessary feature of a civil war is a viable and organized armed opponent that confronts the regime. In the Syrian case, the Free Syrian Army is the primary armed challenger. But the FSA has yet to prove its capacity to actually degrade the regime’s staying power any more than the highly disruptive strikes and demonstrations that persist on a daily basis in the country. Estimates of its size range from 1,000 to 40,000–none of these figures have been confirmed. And at any rate, the FSA has denied some attacks on regime loyalists, indicating that in addition to the FSA, local militias may be perpetrating killings against regime loyalists independently from the FSA. This is not surprising, nor is it unique to the Syrian case: loosely organized, opportunistic, local militias are common features of most civil wars.

3). Plain, old-fashioned, wishful thinking. Syria likely crossed the threshold into civil war last summer. Why were we all so slow to admit it? A considerable body of work in psychology shows that people essentially see what they want to see. No one–not even Assad’s regime–wants to see a civil war in Syria. My guess is that observers all over the world–whether they be in the UN, the Arab League, the US, Iran, Russia, China, or Turkey–are also hoping that the unrest stops soon. I, myself, have been holding out hopes that the Syrian uprising would remain nonviolent. I have also been convinced that the opposition’s best chance at winning would be through effective prosecution of civil resistance through a unified, popular movement. And I have not wanted to distract attention from the persistent and courageous activists who employ nonviolent tactics in the face of regime repression on a daily basis. The label “civil war” seems so violent, so intractable, so uncharacteristic of the spirit of the resistance that continues to unfold in Syria. So, although I wouldn’t deny the fact that Syria had become a civil war, I certainly wasn’t rushing to embrace the fact either.

Sadly, despite our best wishful thinking, we cannot make reality disappear by ignoring its existence.

13 Ways to Support the Syrian Opposition Right Now

In light of the dire news out of Syria, international action is ever more urgent. In my judgment, Syria reflects one of the paradoxes of international politics: its strategic importance in the region renders international military action nearly impossible–or at least extremely unlikely. Regional and global powers are not willing to risk the potential regional  or global conflagration that would result from foreign military intervention in such a key state, even if inaction means that they will be witnesses to the senseless slaughter of thousands of civilians.

But when governments and international governmental organizations are unwilling or unable to act, civilians across the globe can still play a vital role. It’s time to channel the power of “civilian diplomacy”–a concept that has some real potential to change the course of the Syrian revolution and to help the Syrian people realize their aims regardless of the dilly-dallying of foreign states.

This means you.

A colleague of mine, who wished to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the topic, asked me to post the following information. Please read, circulate, and (if you are in a position to do so), help to implement these 13 ways to support the Syrian opposition.

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Support from Damascus (though working with exiles w/ links on the inside also possible):

• Support forums for civil resistance planning and evaluation:  Any plan to force Assad’s nonviolent ouster and usher in a transition should ideally be drafted by Syrians living inside Syria.  Because intense repression inside Syria makes this very difficult, such a plan could be generated through an iterative process involving inside and outside activists. There are NGOs already working with Syrian exile members to help them think through civil resistance options. We should help a small team of savvy Syrian strategists develop a plan, in coordination with Local Coordination Committees (LCCs)/activist youth on the inside (via secure communications), and evaluate the execution of that strategy to know which tactics/approaches are working and which are not. Tactics flow from strategy, not vice-versa. LCCs and other inside groups are best positioned to operationalize whatever strategic plan is developed. This would be an obvious division of labor between the outside and inside opposition.

• Encourage the opposition to consider unity “shock tactics”: ordinary Christians and Alawi may not like the regime, but they prefer an unsatisfactory status quo to an uncertain and potentially hostile future. They need reassurances that go beyond words. Potentially powerful symbolic actions include: a Friday “protest” whose theme is unity and involves repairing Christian churches and picking up trash in mixed communities; candlelight vigils in Damascus and Aleppo organized by a cross-confessional group of Syrian women to commemorate all victims of the uprising; strong, well-publicized denunciations of violence targeting minorities by influential Sunni leaders; letters hand-delivered to Christian leaders requesting their participation in the Arab League monitoring mission.

• Encourage inside opposition to strengthen parallel structures and institutions: In an environment where street protests and labor strikes are risky, the opposition should be encouraged to continue to strengthen autonomous local institutions. It is difficult for the regime to target large numbers of people who stop supporting state-run schools and clinics and instead set up their own parallel systems – but the message of non-cooperation with the regime would be clear.  The diaspora and business community should be involved in supporting private clinics and charities to help build local autonomy, possibly under the LCCs’ organizational umbrella.

• Connect/train Syrian opposition in crowd-sourcing technology:  Crowd-sourcing technology can help the Syrian opposition plan and execute protests, monitor security force movements, collect and document evidence of human rights abuses and atrocities, etc., like this. There are teams that follow and help apply all the technology tools (Martus, Mobile Accord, Frontline SMS, Ushahidi, Cognitive Edge) that could provide the Syrian opposition a very useful parallel communication structure.

•  Help the nonviolent opposition publicize successes: Syrians need to see that civil resistance is working to discourage them from giving up, taking up arms, or waiting for outside military intervention.  Every regime concession (e.g. release of prisoners, allowing in monitors, etc.) and concrete sign of regime isolation needs to be credited to the courageous nonviolent resistance.  Embassies should publicly credit the nonviolent opposition for successes and help them publicize victories over the TV, radio and other channels of communication.

• Encourage the opposition to strategize around elections (maybe):  It is unclear how the regime will approach upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, whether Article 8 is on the table and/or whether those outside of the “loyal opposition” would even be allowed to run, but the opposition should at least have a plan for whether and how to participate in elections. Boycotting might seem like the obvious thing to do unless the opposition could take advantage of any political space opened up by elections. Although it is likely that Assad would rig the elections, this course of action is fraught with risk, particularly if the opposition is prepared to show the fraud and mobilize around it.  Training Syrian youth in election monitoring and parallel vote tabulation (ideally by an Arab NGO) could be very helpful down the road.

 Support from the international community:

• Press Al Jazeera (and other satellite stations) to broadcast Arabic-language documentary films on civil resistance, including Bringing Down a Dictator, A Force More Powerful, and Civil Resistance: A First Look into Syria:  These films are powerful, they are in Arabic, and they will show Syrians what nonviolent movements in other repressive environments have done to communicate around repression, pull key pillars of support, innovate tactically, and outmaneuver a militarily superior adversary. These films should be played repeatedly by multiple stations – obtaining copyright permission is easy.

•  Strengthen the opposition’s strategic communication capabilities:  Get as many Syrian opposition leaders as possible, Syrian National Council (SNC) and non-SNC (inside and outside), trained in how to craft pillar-specific messages, communicate an inclusive vision of tomorrow, and declare small victories for the nonviolent opposition using traditional and non-traditional means. LCCs and similar Facebook pages are the most effective messengers right now.

• Help the opposition think through strikes and boycotts: There are dozens of different types of strikes, boycotts, and “go slow” tactics available to nonviolent activists. These dispersed actions could allow more Syrians to participate in the opposition while minimizing the risk of regime repression. Syrian activists and sympathetic businessmen should be encouraged to first analyze which businesses (in Syria and outside) would be most vulnerable to consumer boycotts, which industries would be most susceptible to worker strikes or collective “underperformance”, and then develop a plan to target those businesses and industries.  The oil sector, pro-regime businesses, and companies whose workers are unhappy with pay or working conditions would be obvious candidates.  Syrian exile communities could be encouraged to develop campaigns targeting pro-regime businesses on the outside using well-publicized boycotts, sit-ins, and pickets.

• Encourage diaspora and business community to develop a solidarity/strike fund: Striking Syrians need to know that there is funding available to support themselves and their families, particularly in the event that they lose their jobs or other sources of income. Bank accounts could be set up in Lebanon, Dubai, Turkey or elsewhere for that purpose (and other Embassies in Damascus could help distribute quick response funds to needy families). This is currently being done piece meal, but greater coordination would help the nonviolent protestors.

• Tap into celebrities and famous Syrian diaspora: There are a number of famous Syrians (actors, singers, comics, etc.) in the exile community whose popularity transcends sect, ethnicity or confession. These are the figures whose star power could help spread support for the opposition, make special appeals to minorities, and focus media attention on the nonviolent resistance. We should encourage the Syrian opposition to tap into this potentially huge resource. Ideally, famous Alawi and Christian Syrians who sympathize with the opposition (ex. Nadia Souliman) should lead outreach efforts to prominent Christian leaders.

• Encourage the opposition to embrace tactical negotiations: By demonstrating openness to negotiations, the opposition reinforces its image as a force of moderation rather than a bunch of extremists (as the regime would have it.)  The perception of moderation, in the case of Syria, could help sell the opposition to minority members and fence-sitters.  More importantly, being open to informal negotiations with members of the regime’s remaining pillars (security forces, bureaucracy, business elite), whose loyalties might be wavering, allows the opposition to communicate their intentions related to a post-Assad Syria – i.e. that these individuals have a future in it. On the other hand, the opposition risks losing the street if they negotiate with a regime with so much blood on its hands. For this reason, whoever from the opposition leads the negotiations should be respected by the street.  He/she must be able to explain the purpose and parameters of the negotiations to the resisting population and maintain transparency. Most importantly, opposition movements who choose to negotiate should never lose the ability to mobilize the masses and target the regime with nonviolent sanctions.

• Dealing with the armed opposition: It is unlikely that the Free Syrian Army and other armed groups will disappear. The nonviolent opposition should maintain informal but regular communication with the armed groups. Ideally, defectors will be kept busy in neighboring countries and limit their armed attacks inside the country. Also, defectors could be involved in nonviolent forms of sabotage that obstruct the regime’s killing machine but do not result in injuries or deaths.  To the extent possible, defectors should be exposed to civil resistance materials and trainings.

Wilson Center Talk This Thursday

UPDATE: The webcast for our talk is now available for viewing here.

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Maria Stephan and I will be talking about Why Civil Resistance Works at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on Thursday, Dec. 8th at noon in the 6th Floor Moynihan Board Room. Come on by!

WPR Interview: Syria, Occupy Wall Street, and Civil Resistance

Maria J. Stephan and I had a conversation with Veronica Rueckert of Wisconsin Public Radio on November 11th. We talked about our book and its implications for Syria, Occupy Wall Street, Iran, and other cases.

Listen to the interview here.

Countries Don’t “Slip” Into Sectarian War

A couple of weeks ago, Robert Fisk reported in the Independent that Syria is slipping into sectarian civil war.

I have no doubt that the accounts he gives are true. The news out of Syria is troubling indeed. Today the UN announced that 3,500 civilians are dead, with regime violence on the rise day by day. Most activists place the number much higher than 3,500. With this level of violence, it is not surprising that many analysts are cynical.

That said, there are a few things to keep in mind.

1). Countries don’t “slip” into civil war. Such wars arise because people make choices. In a place like Syria, civil war is neither accidental nor predetermined. Syrian activists can maintain nonviolent discipline if they choose to; they cannot be “forced” to choose violence as an offensive strategy. They can also choose to issue demands short of Assad’s immediate departure, such as his holding competitive elections with international observers. Assad can decide, if he wishes, to stop the killing by agreeing to leave. Or, he can decide to stop the killing but stay in power. I doubt he will choose either. This is because…

2). In a crisis, dictators will try to stay in power by dividing and ruling. This strategy is working pretty well for Assad. His brutality has convinced a number of Syrians to take up arms against him. And as Fisk mentions, stories about the counter-violence by these rebels has been just the propaganda boost that Assad needs to create sympathy from his own supporters in Damascus, as well as the pretext he needs to ramp up the killing with impunity. The Syrians involved in the uprising must not forget that…

3). They have choices, and their choices have consequences. It’s worth mentioning again, because if Syria blows up, it will be because Assad was better at divide-and-rule than the nonviolent campaign was. The more violent acts and rhetoric we see coming from the anti-Assad group, the more we will see the pro-Assad group cling together for dear life and retaliate in kind. In a rather intelligent Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing today, State Department official Jeffrey Feltman rightly concludes that using violence will strengthen Assad, not diminish him. Fortunately, there is a realistic alternative:

4). Nonviolent resistance is the best bet in Syria. Eric Stoner has a thorough piece today on the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline in Syria. I wholeheartedly agree with his conclusions based on the strategic potential of civil resistance in this case, as well as the fact that violent civil conflict would be disastrous for Syria’s social, political, economic, and humanitarian well-being in the long run. If the core of the movement is unable to control its violent flank, then the movement must simply drown out the violence with more nonviolent acts. But it will take some time, and…

5). It’s understandable why people want to retaliate with violence. Assad has certainly crossed the lines of morality, at least 3,500 times over the past seven months. But leaving aside whether violent resistance is justified, the question becomes how to remove this murderous tyrant from power–and to replace him with the type of system that people would want their children to grow up in. Wouldn’t that be the best revenge? The odds that such an outcome could be achieved with violence are slim indeed.

Syrian Sit-in on Youtube

More tactical innovation, this time from the Sham News Network. So, in studying many nonviolent campaigns around the world, it seems that one of the necessary elements of success is participation. However, repression can often diminish participation. For Syrians today, the question is how to maintain participation in the face of brutality from the regime? The key problem here is: how do nonviolent activists overcome fear?

In speaking to a number of activists, it strikes me that feeling solidarity from the outside can help people to feel that they are not alone, and this (along with many other things) can help to reduce fear. The SNN is attempting a solidarity sit-in on YouTube, largely to demonstrate to Syrians that they are not alone and to maintain the movement’s momentum.

From SNN:

The initiative of the “Syrian Sit-in on YouTube” was launched by Sham News Network (SNN). It is an open sit-in on YouTube, where we all gather all over the world, from all nationalities in order to express our solidarity with the demands of the free Syrian people. Also, we want to clarify to Bashar Al-Assad, his regime, and his gangs that we will topple you and will drive you to the court. This sit-in is not an alternative of the actual peaceful Sit-in or protests in any way, but it is an additional means to ensure the unity of the Syrian people of its entire kinds and levels in supporting the Syrian revolution. This Sit-in, in addition, has a role in spot the light on the Arabic and global solidarity with the freedom of the Syrian revolution and its legitimate demands. Moreover, this Sit-in is going to be the fuel to keep us do our daily protests all over our beloved Syria and follow on our peaceful revolution. Together, we will make the Syrian Sit-in on YouTube the podium where all free people including politicians, leaders, religious figures, intellectuals, journalists, artists, doctors, activists, engineers, students, etc will declare through it their solidarity with the Syrian revolution, freedom of the Syrian people, and its legitimate demands.

To participate, follow these instructions:

1 – Film yourself Saying :
(I am in solidarity with the Syrian people. I reject the brutality and
killing that the Syrian authorities are committing against the unarmed
Syrian people. And because silence is participation in this crime, I
declare my participation in the Syrian Sit-in on Youtube).

2 – Send your film to: SyrianHub@gmail.com.

I went ahead and made a short film, which you can find here. And then the SNN asked me to do a plug on my blog about them, and I decided to do that too, because if I were in a situation like theirs, I wouldn’t want to be ignored or forgotten.

Why Violence Has Declined

Check out Steven Pinker:

And check out his new book, “The Better Angels of Our Nature.” Isn’t that a great title?

And why has violence declined? Maybe because it doesn’t really work.

New Data on Bandhs in Nepal

Bandhs are politically-motivated strikes, ranging from the closing of stores to nationwide strikes. Today Kristine Eck sent me this link to an extremely detailed and comprehensive online database of bandhs in Nepal. Worth checking out for those interested in data or strikes as a tactic.

New Tactic: Keeping Wall Street Occupied

This video is going viral. H/t to Sherrill Stroschein.