Maria J. Stephan and I had a conversation with Veronica Rueckert of Wisconsin Public Radio on November 11th. We talked about our book and its implications for Syria, Occupy Wall Street, Iran, and other cases.
Listen to the interview here.
Maria J. Stephan and I had a conversation with Veronica Rueckert of Wisconsin Public Radio on November 11th. We talked about our book and its implications for Syria, Occupy Wall Street, Iran, and other cases.
Listen to the interview here.
A couple of weeks ago, Robert Fisk reported in the Independent that Syria is slipping into sectarian civil war.
I have no doubt that the accounts he gives are true. The news out of Syria is troubling indeed. Today the UN announced that 3,500 civilians are dead, with regime violence on the rise day by day. Most activists place the number much higher than 3,500. With this level of violence, it is not surprising that many analysts are cynical.
That said, there are a few things to keep in mind.
1). Countries don’t “slip” into civil war. Such wars arise because people make choices. In a place like Syria, civil war is neither accidental nor predetermined. Syrian activists can maintain nonviolent discipline if they choose to; they cannot be “forced” to choose violence as an offensive strategy. They can also choose to issue demands short of Assad’s immediate departure, such as his holding competitive elections with international observers. Assad can decide, if he wishes, to stop the killing by agreeing to leave. Or, he can decide to stop the killing but stay in power. I doubt he will choose either. This is because…
2). In a crisis, dictators will try to stay in power by dividing and ruling. This strategy is working pretty well for Assad. His brutality has convinced a number of Syrians to take up arms against him. And as Fisk mentions, stories about the counter-violence by these rebels has been just the propaganda boost that Assad needs to create sympathy from his own supporters in Damascus, as well as the pretext he needs to ramp up the killing with impunity. The Syrians involved in the uprising must not forget that…
3). They have choices, and their choices have consequences. It’s worth mentioning again, because if Syria blows up, it will be because Assad was better at divide-and-rule than the nonviolent campaign was. The more violent acts and rhetoric we see coming from the anti-Assad group, the more we will see the pro-Assad group cling together for dear life and retaliate in kind. In a rather intelligent Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing today, State Department official Jeffrey Feltman rightly concludes that using violence will strengthen Assad, not diminish him. Fortunately, there is a realistic alternative:
4). Nonviolent resistance is the best bet in Syria. Eric Stoner has a thorough piece today on the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline in Syria. I wholeheartedly agree with his conclusions based on the strategic potential of civil resistance in this case, as well as the fact that violent civil conflict would be disastrous for Syria’s social, political, economic, and humanitarian well-being in the long run. If the core of the movement is unable to control its violent flank, then the movement must simply drown out the violence with more nonviolent acts. But it will take some time, and…
5). It’s understandable why people want to retaliate with violence. Assad has certainly crossed the lines of morality, at least 3,500 times over the past seven months. But leaving aside whether violent resistance is justified, the question becomes how to remove this murderous tyrant from power–and to replace him with the type of system that people would want their children to grow up in. Wouldn’t that be the best revenge? The odds that such an outcome could be achieved with violence are slim indeed.
More tactical innovation, this time from the Sham News Network. So, in studying many nonviolent campaigns around the world, it seems that one of the necessary elements of success is participation. However, repression can often diminish participation. For Syrians today, the question is how to maintain participation in the face of brutality from the regime? The key problem here is: how do nonviolent activists overcome fear?
In speaking to a number of activists, it strikes me that feeling solidarity from the outside can help people to feel that they are not alone, and this (along with many other things) can help to reduce fear. The SNN is attempting a solidarity sit-in on YouTube, largely to demonstrate to Syrians that they are not alone and to maintain the movement’s momentum.
From SNN:
The initiative of the “Syrian Sit-in on YouTube” was launched by Sham News Network (SNN). It is an open sit-in on YouTube, where we all gather all over the world, from all nationalities in order to express our solidarity with the demands of the free Syrian people. Also, we want to clarify to Bashar Al-Assad, his regime, and his gangs that we will topple you and will drive you to the court. This sit-in is not an alternative of the actual peaceful Sit-in or protests in any way, but it is an additional means to ensure the unity of the Syrian people of its entire kinds and levels in supporting the Syrian revolution. This Sit-in, in addition, has a role in spot the light on the Arabic and global solidarity with the freedom of the Syrian revolution and its legitimate demands. Moreover, this Sit-in is going to be the fuel to keep us do our daily protests all over our beloved Syria and follow on our peaceful revolution. Together, we will make the Syrian Sit-in on YouTube the podium where all free people including politicians, leaders, religious figures, intellectuals, journalists, artists, doctors, activists, engineers, students, etc will declare through it their solidarity with the Syrian revolution, freedom of the Syrian people, and its legitimate demands.
1 – Film yourself Saying :
(I am in solidarity with the Syrian people. I reject the brutality and
killing that the Syrian authorities are committing against the unarmed
Syrian people. And because silence is participation in this crime, I
declare my participation in the Syrian Sit-in on Youtube).2 – Send your film to: SyrianHub@gmail.com.
And check out his new book, “The Better Angels of Our Nature.” Isn’t that a great title?
And why has violence declined? Maybe because it doesn’t really work.
Bandhs are politically-motivated strikes, ranging from the closing of stores to nationwide strikes. Today Kristine Eck sent me this link to an extremely detailed and comprehensive online database of bandhs in Nepal. Worth checking out for those interested in data or strikes as a tactic.
This video is going viral. H/t to Sherrill Stroschein.
This is a cross-post from my original post on The Monkey Cage:
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This week, the New York Times reported that Turkey has begun to actively support the Free Syrian Army by providing territorial shelter in a guarded camp. From the Times:
Turkey is hosting an armed opposition group waging an insurgency against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, providing shelter to the commander and dozens of members of the group, the Free Syrian Army, and allowing them to orchestrate attacks across the border from inside a camp guarded by the Turkish military.
Two questions immediately emerge: 1) How will the provision of sanctuary affect the rebels’ chances of defeating Assad; and 2). What are the long-term regional consequences of providing sanctuary to a rebel organization? The answer to both questions: rebel group sanctuary can be a game-changer.
Regarding the first question, a number of scholars have previously found that external sanctuary is associated with insurgent success. Jeffrey Record, for instance, reviewed a number of insurgencies and found that rebel groups that secured sanctuary abroad were likelier to succeed. Dan Byman, Peter Chalk, et al also identified sanctuary as the most important type of support an insurgent group can receive, as it allows rebels to move and organize freely, to import weapons, and to train for operations. However, they write,
Foreign assistance in the form of international sanctuaries, while often extremely useful to guerrillas, can also have a negative impact. In moving abroad, insurgents risk cutting themselves off from their base of popular support. Resting and recuperating across a border, while providing obvious benefits, also carries the danger of operational isolation from potentially lucrative political and military targets.
This seems particularly true in the Syrian case, where the Free Syrian Army’s contact with local activists and rebels is contested. From the Times:
Though many analysts contend that defectors’ attacks in Syria appear uncoordinated and local, Colonel As’aad claimed to be in full operational control. He said that he was in charge of planning “full military operations” while leaving smaller clashes and day-to-day decisions up to commanders in the field. Nevertheless, he is in daily contact with the commanders of each battalion, he said, spending hours a day checking e-mail on a laptop connected to one of four telephones — including a satellite phone — provided to him by Syrian expatriates living in the United States, Europe and the Persian Gulf.
In sum, sanctuary can help an armed insurgency, but it certainly carries a number of risks and does not guarantee success by any means.
So how will these developments affect the conflict in the longer term? Recent research is pessimistic. According to Idean Salehyan, providing sanctuary to a rebel group makes a conflict more likely to escalate to civil war—and one that lasts longer than the average civil war. Moreover, providing sanctuary increases the chances that the civil conflict will escalate into an inter-state one (in this case, between Turkey and Syria) or perhaps even wider.
Now, this research assumes that the rebel group is viable and not just a small and disorganized group. We don’t really know whether the Free Syrian Army is the real deal yet. Rebel groups have massive incentives to over-represent their size and strength in such situations. As the Times reports, the movement’s claims that it consists of thousands of followers and dozens of battalions have not yet been verified. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe the group is coalescing. Recent attacks against government troops within Syria suggest that there is at least some coordinated contact among operatives on the inside. Apparently the Syrian Free Army is actively recruiting new members on a regular basis. With the accumulation of weapons, the ability to organize freely, and the fact that many previously nonviolent Syrian activists are now openly calling for armed uprising against the increasingly brutal state, the Free Syrian Army has considerable sympathy and support within the country. And Turkey’s decision to support the group is also telling: in a new paper, Salehyan, David Cunningham, and Kristian Gleditsch argue that states are more likely to support rebel groups when they gauge the groups to be moderately strong. This suggests that Turkey, at least, may view the Free Syrian Army as a viable entity.
Ultimately, research tells us that if the Free Syrian Army is the real deal, then Turkey’s provision of sanctuary heightens the risk of protracted civil war breaking out in Syria. Before this development, civil war was already a risk. But now the risk is much higher. Before territorial protection, the group was no more than a radical flank accompanying a nonviolent campaign. But their new sanctuary will certainly help them build their strength, if not their operational effectiveness, to become a full-blown insurgency.
The good news is that there is still a committed civilian-led uprising occurring in Syria, and although the regime’s extreme violence has dealt some severe setbacks to this movement, it is still quite active and disruptive. This is good news is because recent research shows that civil resistance activities—even when conducted in the context of armed conflict—can enhance the possibilities of more durable civil peace and democracy after the conflict ends. In other words, although some people may choose to use violence to confront the regime, the conflict does not have to devolve into a purely violent one. And if civilian-led nonviolent resistance does remain the centerpiece of the anti-Assad campaign, we can be much more optimistic about the outcome and aftermath of the conflict.
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